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Slow Fog: Udesk customer service script was implanted with malicious code that can steal user session data and replace recharge addresses

According to Slow Fog's disclosure, its security personnel discovered that the script udeskApi.2026-10-16.cached.js related to the Udesk customer service system was implanted with a malicious loader during routine threat intelligence checks. This loader hides the address through hexadecimal encoding and asynchronously loads the remote script deeps.js (sourced from udeskqlobal[.]com, note that the domain name starts with the letter q). This script reads accessible Cookies, localStorage, and sessionStorage on the page, intercepts form and login/authentication requests, and sends data to udeskqlobal[.]com/c.php. Attackers may use this to impersonate sessions or take over accounts. This data collection behavior is not restricted by the target site's rules, and unmatched pages may also be affected.According to Slow Fog's analysis, this script also targets three types of sites: mgbx[.]com, bikingex[.], and bitxex[.]io, scanning the recharge page every 200 milliseconds and replacing identified recharge addresses with preset BTC, EVM, TRON, Solana, LTC, and DOGE addresses. At the same time, the script manipulates the clipboard API, replaces copy buttons, and intercepts copy events, making users see and copy tampered addresses. If users transfer funds to this address, the money will flow into the attacker's address.

Slow Fog Report: Public Code Weaponized, iOS Encrypted Wallets Face Threats

The security organization SlowMist has released an in-depth threat intelligence report on the DarkSword Trojan backend and iOS attack chain. The report tracks the evolution of this attack infrastructure and reveals its high danger to cryptocurrency asset users.According to SlowMist's analysis, after the relevant exploit code was made public in March 2026, DarkSword-PROV2 appeared on GitHub in July, and its attack infrastructure was observed to be operational by late September.The SlowMist team not only tracked its online infrastructure but also correlated its management panel with public GitHub repositories, dissecting the exploit code, delivery chain, and post-compromise capabilities. The report highlighted several key findings of this attack framework: a highly automated complete attack pipeline that integrates vulnerability delivery, device and data collection, data theft, and cryptocurrency wallet fund aggregation functions.The extensive and deep data theft capabilities of this toolkit target not only keychains, files, and information but also specifically cryptocurrency wallet data, with the ability to decrypt wallet data and aggregate funds. Although the toolkit claims to support iOS 13 and above, code analysis confirms that its actual effective exploit window is concentrated in the iOS 18.6--18.7.2 and iOS 26--26.1 version ranges. The publicly available vulnerability components have been weaponized and integrated into a deployable attack framework, significantly lowering the threshold for launching complex iOS attacks.In response to this threat, SlowMist has provided clear security recommendations. Users should keep their iOS systems updated and avoid clicking on untrusted links, as merely opening a malicious page in the Safari browser could trigger vulnerabilities. If a device has accessed suspicious landing pages, users should consider their mnemonic phrases and private keys as compromised and must create new wallets and transfer assets using a clean device that has never accessed that page.Additionally, users should thoroughly check for abnormal transactions and token authorizations across various chains and immediately revoke unnecessary authorizations.

Slow Fog Analysis suggests hardware implantation to steal mnemonic phrases from Ledger

The Chief Information Security Officer of Slow Mist Security, 23pds, stated that if the modification of the Ledger device's PCB is indeed as described by former Mt. Gox CEO Mark Karpelès, the attacker would possess a considerable level of technical skill.23pds mentioned that the possible attack process involves the wallet generating a mnemonic phrase within a secure element and displaying it on the screen for the user to write down. A malicious module could obtain the displayed content through screen data lines such as SPI, record the complete mnemonic phrase, and then send the data to the attacker via LTE/eSIM. The secure element can prevent the private key from being directly read or exported, but it cannot stop external modules from accessing the information currently displayed on the screen. He noted that the above analysis is based on the premise that the PCB has indeed been modified in the described manner, and the relevant attack paths and hardware implantation still require independent verification.Mark Karpelès previously stated that a Ledger hardware wallet he received was suspected of being implanted with a spy module. The device came from Malaysia, the outer packaging was intact with shrink wrap, and the implant was hidden in the position where the screen originally had a cushion, containing LTE communication components, an antenna, eSIM, and a microcontroller connected to the Ledger SPI bus, capable of analyzing the characters displayed to the user and sending relevant data after the mnemonic phrase setup is completed.
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