Slow Mist: The attack on Orion Protocol was due to the lack of reentrancy protection in the contract's exchange function
ChainCatcher news, this morning the contracts on the ETH and BSC chains of the Orion Protocol project were attacked, with the attacker profiting approximately $3.027 million. The analysis of the attack process and reasons by the SlowMist security team is as follows:The attacker first called the depositAsset function of the ExchangeWithAtomic contract to make a deposit, putting in 0.5 USDC tokens in preparation for the attack below;The attacker borrowed 2.8447 million USDT tokens through a flash loan, then called the doSwapThroughOrionPool function of the ExchangeWithAtomic contract to exchange tokens, with the exchange path being [USDC -> ATK (a malicious token created by the attacker) -> USDT];The result of the exchange is calculated by subtracting the USDT token balance in the ExchangeWithAtomic contract before the exchange (2.8447 million) from the balance after the exchange. However, the problem arises when exchanging USDC -> ATK, which calls the transfer function of the ATK token. This function, maliciously constructed by the attacker, will call the depositAsset function of the ExchangeWithAtomic contract to deposit the borrowed 2.844 million USDT tokens into the ExchangeWithAtomic contract. At this point, the deposit in the ExchangeWithAtomic contract is successfully recorded as 2.8447 million, and the USDT token balance in the ExchangeWithAtomic contract becomes 5.689 million, causing the amount of USDT tokens exchanged by the attacker to be calculated as 5.689 million minus 2.8447 million, which equals 2.8447 million;After the exchange, the USDT tokens will finally update the ledger of the attack contract in the ExchangeWithAtomic contract by calling the library function creditUserAssets, resulting in the attack contract's USDT token deposit in the ExchangeWithAtomic contract being recorded as 5.689 million;Finally, the attacker calls the withdraw function in the ExchangeWithAtomic contract to withdraw USDT, repaying the flash loan and converting the remaining 2.836 million USDT tokens into WETH for profit. The attacker used the same method to launch an attack on the BSC chain, profiting $191,000;The fundamental reason for this attack lies in the lack of reentrancy protection in the contract's exchange function, and the value of the ledger deposit being updated after the exchange is calculated based on the difference in token balances before and after the exchange, allowing the attacker to exploit the fake tokens to reenter the deposit function and obtain more tokens than expected.
